Amazigh Curators
Women's Role in Maintaining Morocco's Berber culture

Jenna Williams
Jenna Williams graduated from the Frederik Meijer Honors College at Grand Valley State University with degree in International Relations and a minor in Middle Eastern Studies, with an emphasis on North Africa. While an undergraduate, she studied abroad in Morocco for nine months, where she focused on Arabic, gender studies, youth culture and nationalism. She has plans to obtain a PhD in Cultural Anthropology.
Language is a means of communication, a marker of identity, a larger heritage, and an invaluable aspect of culture. UNESCO lists a total of 577 languages as critically endangered, the final stage before extinction. Three of these are currently spoken within the state of Morocco: Tamazight (Ait Rouadi), Sanhaya of Srair, and Ghomra (which has less than 100 speakers). This loss of linguistic diversity weakens the unique ethno-scientific knowledge hidden in such languages, such as the history and culture of the people who speak them. In light of this ongoing loss, it is vital to highlight the steps that have been made to preserve endangered lifestyles, languages and heritages in an era of globalization. As Berber culture’s longest curators, women have made vital contributions to the care and maintenance of their culture, to Moroccan society, and to the Berber movement. This essay argues that Amazigh women’s gendered seclusion from
Moroccan society created an environment that facilitated the preservation of Amazigh culture, but at the expense of women’s rights. Second, this essay contends that modern efforts to preserve Amazigh culture, such as language standardization and instituting Tamazight script, have ultimately sidelined the very women who protected it for decades.

Before proceeding further, it is important to define a few of the key terms that will be used in this study, specifically “culture,” “language,” and “identity.” Culture, encompassing language, history, geography, religion, political system, literature, architecture, and tradition, is what characterizes a society as an identifiable community. Social scientists’ definitions for the term “culture” are predictably broad. In one formulation, “a society’s culture consists of whatever it is one has to know or believe in order to operate in a manner acceptable to its members.” In other words, “culture is a way of life. It is the content within which we exist, think, feel and relate to others. It is the glue that binds a group of people together.” The strength of a culture resides in its power to assimilate others; a strong culture is less likely to be invaded by a foreign culture and a weak culture tends to be less flexible and tolerant.

Anthropologists concerned with the relationship between language and culture have designed their theories through the Whorf hypothesis, which stipulates that the various forms of meanings created in the patterns of language reflect and produce distinctive views of the world and condition the particularities of a culture. Culture is also a basis of identity, as it distinguishes between “us” and “others” and limits the borders of national solidarity. Thus, the distinctions between an Arab and a Berber are fundamentally a function of culture. Robert Linton adds further nuance to the idea of culture by distinguishing between social and biological heritage, arguing the culture in which an individual is brought up is his or her social heritage, and is distinct from biological heritage. Culture, therefore, involves the shared mentality of a given society, which may be learned.

Language is how humans share their culture with others and it holds culturally specific idioms, gendered phrases, deep historical and traditional context, and the basis for sharing identity. Therefore, the question of preserving Amazigh culture is inextricable from the protection of the many dialects falling under the umbrella language, Tamazight. Anthropologists hypothesize that language comprises three basic functions; expressing, embodying, and symbolizing cultural reality. It expresses facts, ideas or events that are communicable because they refer to a stock of knowledge about the world shared by other people. The way people use the spoken, written, or visual medium itself creates distinctive meanings that are understandable to the group they belong to. Among the ways these may be communicated are a speaker's tone of voice, accent, conversational style, gestures, and facial expressions. Additionally, language is a system of signs that is seen as having a cultural value. Speakers identify themselves and others through their use of language; they view their language as a symbol of their social identity.

Languages, particularly mother tongues, are important for identity building. They have a symbolic role as they represent cultural elements that affect the identity of individuals. Mother tongues define people and groups in their culture, and ideology, shaping people’s
personalities and ways of thinking. It is the mother tongue which is the vehicle of a rich oral literature in all its facets (songs, poems, anecdotes, proverbs, riddles, etc.) and which most clearly gives voice to a people's feelings, aspirations, and beliefs. Occasionally, a bilingual shift to a second language is so powerful that it provokes loss of the mother tongue and all the assets that the language provides, including its link to culture. This loss highlights a distinction proposed by Wallace Lambert, who divided bilingualism into two types: "subtractive" and "additive." Subtractive bilingualism refers to cases in which a second language is acquired to the detriment of the first language, and assimilation into the target culture threatens to replace the native culture. In cases of additive bilingualism, the first identity is maintained while the target identity is also acquired. The two idioms function in different communicative situations, and a second cultural identity is added to and coexists with the first. I argue the Moroccan state has encouraged subtractive bilingualism, attempting to eclipse Berber identity and culture through the enactment of Arabization policies. However, Amazigh women have largely retained their Berber identity due to a lack of education and exposure to the public space in which these policies operate.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

This paper contends that the objective of the early Moroccan state and its Arabo-Islamic identity was to assimilate the largely rural Amazigh population into the desired urban, Arabophone populace. Theory states that when a society has a large majority of individuals from one culture, individuals from minority groups will be assimilated more quickly: a proposition confirmed by examining US census data. However, the Amazigh culture and language have remained fairly resilient. Despite a steady decline in Amazigh speakers, Berber identity is still alive within the aging female population and interest groups. The female identity, however, is still heavily stigmatized in Morocco and even more so within the Amazigh community, which is profoundly divided between groups including female communities which speak a feminized dialect of Tashelhit, rural communities which have adopted Arab practices, Amazigh cultural purists, and scholars. To make sense of this contentious environment, it is necessary to explore the socio-political conditions which instigated the devaluation of the Berber culture and forced women to become key inheritors of a 2,000 year old culture.

The division of Berbers and Arabs began early in the period of French colonization and culminated with the Berber Dahir of 1930, a colonial decree incorporating traditional Berber customs—which diverged appreciably from sharia—into Algeria's legal order. The document was perceived by Arab nationalists as a Machiavellian divide-and-conquer strategy that separated the Muslim population along meritless ethnic lines. Berbers, they contended, were Muslims, whose judicial system should be under sharia law rather than French, as stipulated by Article 6 of the Dahir. Arab derision toward the Dahir seeped into Morocco’s independence movement. Any Berber retaining their language and culture was seen as advocating for colonial rule, and an Arabo-Islamic identity became a key pillar of state building efforts undertaken by Arab independence parties. Confrontation between the nationalists and Amazigh reached its climax between 1956 to 1958 when the popular right-wing Istiqlal party claimed political dominance and institutionalized anti-Amazigh sentiment. Leadership posts in majority-Amazigh areas were filled with Istiqlal loyalists, rather than members of the community, leading to Amazigh school closures and the removal of Amazigh language media broadcasts in the name of unification. Reflecting this sentiment, Istiqlal party founder Muhammad Allal al Fassi stated:

"[W]here Arabic constitutes the official language of the Moroccan state, a large number of tribes have preserved their local dialect; this constitutes a grave political and social danger because language has great influence on the mentality of the people since it is the main carrier of ideas. This is why the program of the Istiqlal party requires Arabization has to be total and complete from the first grade of school." A predominantly Berber political party, the Mouvement Populaire (MP), representing the rural sector emerged

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in 1959. The MP constituted an important component of the pro-monarchy coalition that prevented the Istiqlal party from maintaining control over the political system. Another crucial pillar of the monarchy’s rule was the newly formed Forces Armeés Royales (FAR), which was commanded by Berbers who had achieved officer rank in the French military. This political victory, however, hardly constituted an endorsement of the Berber aspect of Moroccan identity. In the years after 1959, Mohammed V undertook a policy of Arabization which was continued by his son, Hassan II. As part of its permanent strategy of balancing the various forces in Morocco, the monarchy took both symbolic and concrete steps to accord with the Arab nationalist vision. In 1961, it passed a law defining Morocco as an Arab and Muslim state, in which the official language was Arabic. The same year, an Arab League-backed institution to promote the Arabization of the educational system opened in Rabat. This formed the precursor to the massive Arabization movement of the 70s and 80s.

Arabization was deemed crucial for forging a modern national identity and cohesive society by Arab urban elites. School textbooks stressed that Moroccan history began with the arrival of Islam and the Idrissi Sharifian dynasty, denying the ancestry of the indigenous people. Berbers were ethnicized into Arabs: the Berber language was a sister to Arabic, the Berbers' origins were said to be in Yemen, where they lived primitively until Islam showed them the light. These themes were convenient for Moroccan elites engaged in state-building, as many relied on preexisting stereotypes and were easily promoted in efforts to create a stable Arabo-Islamic identity. Similarly, Mohamed Abd al-Jabri, one of the leading scholars of Arab-Islamic thought, who, ironically, came from an Amazigh family, was of the opinion that Berber dialects in particular should be destroyed because they were incapable of serving as a national unifier, advocating that they be banned from schools, radio, and television. Bruce Maddy-Weitzman sums up the extent of the new government's Arabist tendencies: "regarding Berber identity and the Berber language, there was hardly any difference, at least on the declarative level, between the monarchy’s orientation and that of the Istiqlal!"

In response to these and other betrayals from the monarchy they had supported, Berber relations with the government became increasingly frayed. Successive attempts at Arabization opened in Rabat. Government officials were quick to conclude that the coup constituted a Berber challenge to their position in society. Istiqlal condemned the coup attempt as a “manifestation of retrograde Berber nationalism.” Large numbers of Berbers were purged from the security services, and Berbers were excluded from sensitive positions in the government and palace. Amid the chaos, racial mistrust of the Berber community spread through the state, making it difficult for ethnic Berbers to have stable jobs and leading to a rejection of the Amazigh community. At the same time, Morocco experienced an economic collapse, forcing large rural migrations to urban centers in an effort to find greater opportunity and escape the failing agricultural reforms instituted by King Hassan II. While entire families moved in some cases, more often than not the male members of the family would relocate to cities for a majority of the year and return for the harvest. In their absence, rural Amazigh women became stewards of their culture and language as men became bilingual and rejected their tribal identity in the face of Arab hostility.

CURRENT CONTEXT AND EFFORTS

Fundamental to the comprehension of women’s preservation of Amazigh culture is an understanding of their role in language maintenance. Much of the current literature surrounding the topic involves dialectal studies in the formation and understanding of these remote groups. According to Katherine Hoffman, the language of Tashelhit (under the umbrella language of Tamazight) is an exclusively rural language, defined topographically between “plains” and “mountain” speakers. While plains residents are more closely associated with Arab speakers from nearby towns, mountain residents are located more remotely and therefore have had less exposure to Arabic. Men who move their families to cities likely become bilingual in Arabic and may go as far
as to reject the widely stigmatized Berber identity and language. These urban centers encourage the linguistic and social acculturation of non-Arab Moroccans into an Arabo-Islamic state. Yet Hoffman argues that it is in the interest of migrant men that their female family members remain monolingual Tashelhit speakers as it assures that wives will remain on the husband’s homelands, tend land, and preserve his patrimony and reputation while he is gone. Among Tashelhit speakers, men do not value the speech of women whose vernacular does not exemplify the purist norm. This normative dialect, advocated by Amazigh militants, is not the Tashelhit of the monolingual woman, which has evolved over the decades to suit her lifestyle, but a purified Tashelhit which erases feminine linguistic modifications. While women’s maintenance of the Tamazight language is encouraged, their contributions and modifications to it are not.

In these rural communities where labor is gendered and women keep company with women, their ways of speaking are key markers of solidarity, comprising a code of intimacy that marks and validates shared experience, regardless of the dominant society’s evaluation of their cultural and symbolic capital. Since women are considered the agriculturalists, women’s relationship to the land through labor brings them closer to the language than men as their social networks revolve around Tashelhit-speaking places, where discourse markers of femininity develop outside the sphere of Arab influence. Hoffman argues that, because they indirectly index gender rather than directly marking it, the discourse markers of femininity represent Ochs’ theory of a ‘move toward defining men’s and women’s communicative styles, their access to different conversational acts, activities, and genres, and their strategies for performing similar acts, activities and genres.

Hoffman highlights three specific and prevalent examples of Tashelhit-speaking mountain women’s use of vocables to emphasize her argument:

1. *aq!*, a linguistic feature with no referential content, which signifies surprise at an interlocutor’s utterance, indignation, or simply functions to ‘hold the floor’ in preparation for a more extensive utterance. The speaker briefly pauses after this feature and before resuming the utterance.

2. *niġ-am/niġ-ak* (lit. ‘I said to you’ f. or m.), a vocative that precedes a new, not a repeated, segment of discourse; and

3. */ /, a lateral click resembling the sound Anglo Americans use to urge on a horse that operates pragmatically to indicate agreement or close listening to an interlocutor, similar to an English-speaking American women’s use of the back channeling ‘uh huh’ or head nod.

Hoffman states that none of the three discourse markers noted above are found in Arabic discourse, or even in the rural plains dialect: each indexes a mountain dweller, and none is used by men. Another example is the practice of mountain women to repeat a greeting sequence with each individual twice each day, despite the fact that these women spend the entire day together. She argues that this communicative practice marks space and time in which labor and leisure are distinct and that this greeting practice is not found among Tashelhit speakers in the plains and towns, and instead is an indexical practice of mountain rurality, and hence of female gender. Discourse markers such as these suggest that women recognize their reliance on solid female relationships and reinforce the collective linguistic and cultural refuge from outside criticism, echoing national discourses favoring Arabocentric practices. This solidarity has been recognized by
multiple scholars who argue that Tashelhit is the female language of solidarity and that rural women attributed meanings to speaking Tashelhit different from those of the Amazigh activists who demonstrated a preference for linguistic and cultural purity.36

However, this solidarity comes at a price. The spatial arrangement of the Anti-Atlas Mountains, with the men in cities and women in the rural homelands, is crucial to identity construction as a whole, which occurs as these gender dynamics are incorporated into their senses of personhood and community.37 The resulting divide is beneficial for language maintenance but detrimental to human rights, as the gendered practices allow men to delimit the spatial boundaries of women. Therefore, it is not greatly surprising that the main activists behind the ethnic reawakening of the Berber identity in Morocco are largely male. Male and monarchical capitalization of the Berber issue, created the Royal Institute of Amazigh Culture (ICRAM) in June of 2001. Similarly, an unrecognized Amazigh political party, Parti Democratique Amazigh Marocain (PDAM) was a male-dominated movement for its three years of existence, before it fell afoul of a legal ruling denying the establishment of political parties based on purely ethno-linguistic grounds.38

The establishment of Amazigh schooling and the law defining the Tifnagh script as the official writing system for Tamazight largely ignores the issue that Tamazight and its dialects have existed for four thousand years mainly as an oral medium. When writing was instituted, the Latin script was preferred by early pioneers like Basset, Amar Said Boulif, the Pères Blancs of Kabylia and writer and anthropologist Mouloud Mammeri, while some current activists argue for Latin continuation in light of the Tifnagh introduction.39 Again, this denies women’s involvement as they themselves are uneducated in the new script and likely will not be encouraged to learn it. In many rural communities, it is increasingly difficult to educate both genders equally since physical access to public schools is hard to achieve. Many schools and community centers are not only too sparsely located in agrarian areas and therefore seen as unsafe destinations for girls to travel to alone, but are also Arabophone.40 Young girls are therefore more likely to be raised at home and adopt their mothers’ and grandmothers’ role as oral stewards of the Amazigh language and culture while never learning to write the standardized Tifnagh script introduced by Amazigh purists.

Additionally, in urban centers, it is more likely for children to attend free Arabophone public schooling, denying their linguistic identity in school while speaking Moroccan Darija (Moroccan Arabic) with peers, and conversing in Tamazight at home with older relatives, than learn the Tifnagh script. The reality of the situation is that while 95% of school-age children are enrolled in school, less than 15% of first grade students are likely to graduate from high school due to low levels of attendance, teacher absenteeism and a multi-lingual environment which contributes to low literacy.41

To further stress the script’s ineffectiveness, it is important to highlight the Moroccan school system in relation to language studies and its multi-lingual environment.42 Moroccan students who attend public school are taught in Standard Arabic but take a few compulsory years of French, and are encouraged to continue studying French, English or German in their free time. However, this does not account for students in Amazigh schools who are required to learn the newly standardized Tifnagh script, in addition to Arabic and French. In the pursuit of higher education at the university level, many sought-after programs at the university level, especially popular fields of study in economics and the sciences, are taught in French or English. Therefore, to be successful in their studies, students who study standardized Tamazight must also know Standard Arabic, dialectal Moroccan Arabic, French, and/or English (preferably both).
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Since the decision was capitalized by the monarchy and IRCAM (which is decidedly not an Amazigh institution as the king appoints all members rather than the Amazigh community), the historical change was not an Amazigh change but an urban male intellectual change. While the board includes many activists and experts, very few women are present and even fewer are rural women, thus marginalizing them further amongst these dialogues.43 These policies and agendas periodically idealize women’s purity and centrality in Amazigh culture and society, yet are not made in consultation with them. As Hoffman states: “the contemporary emphasis on text creation as a maintenance strategy is particularly perplexing given that the Moroccan Tamazight varieties have remained more widespread in speech in a large part due to Morocco’s low rural female literacy rate and late development of a state educational system.”44

Feminist anthropologist and linguists state that this tendency of systematic exclusion of women from decision-making structures outside the home denies women’s humanity and makes for bad social science.45 The language shift towards Arabic has remained limited—although extensive—precisely because so many rural women have remained monolingual with a female illiteracy rate at 98% in 1997.46 Current illiteracy statistics for rural women and girls vary from the official 54.4% encouraged by the Moroccan state, to as high as 90% in 2013.47 Tamazight dialects have, perversely, been preserved by this status quo.

These maintenance efforts on the part of urban male Arab elite, monarchy figures, and urban male Amazigh activists are largely disconnected from the experience and expertise of rural women, who are most responsible for this preservation. If an integral part of valorizing culture through language is standardization, women’s participation may be further marginalized and dismissed. Nancy Dorian argues that standardization can amplify latent insecurity and shame as speakers see their own way of speaking deficient relative to the standardized form.48 Standardizing the Tamazight language may erase decades of use, integration, and change produced by women, denying the female struggle, story, and efforts under their culture’s gender divide. The standardization of Tamazight dialects by means of a script outside dominant use threatens to marginalize the female community historically tasked with their preservation.

CONCLUSION

Amazigh women have been able to preserve their culture and language due to their forced seclusion from society and have introduced gendered adaptations as their language became dominantly practiced by females. Much to the dissatisfaction of Amazigh activists, these women have do not have idealized preservation efforts in mind; they have little use for the Tifnagh script nor do they practice the “true” Tamazight activists strive for.49 Women often band together and, in certain communities, encourage their children to be bilingual in their dialect and Arabic. Plains residents tend more towards the use of Arabic and have introduced Arabic dialectal marks into their Tashelhit dialect as Arabic is more valuable due to their more frequent interaction with Arabophone communities.50 The infrequent exposure of mountain women, in contrast, has led them to largely ignore formalized maintenance efforts as, in their reality, they were unnecessary. These preservation efforts carry more momentum and meaning in the urban movement and its idealization of Berber women than amongst the women themselves. As scholars have noted, it may not be morally acceptable to encourage continued seclusion of these communities for ethnographic and linguistic studies at the expense of human rights.

Morocco has made progress on its human rights platform within the UN, but it has voiced reservations on articles within the Human Rights Charter concerning women’s roles; the king withdrew reservations on Articles 9(2) and 16 in April 2011, but has yet to accept others.51 The king has also introduced efforts to enforce gendered rights, at least on paper, including the Family Code, Moudawana, in 2003 and the revision of the Constitution in 2011.52 Still, Morocco remains a heavily patriarchal society even in its urban strongholds, making it unlikely that change will reach rural areas in the near future.
Perhaps the first positive change in a long list of the ways Amazigh women are negatively treated and perceived may be the acknowledgement of their contributions to their culture, a culture systematically rejected by the Arabophone elite and Berber men who idealized their women but did not participate in the process of maintenance. This acceptance of the ‘real’ Amazigh woman rather than the purist vision could contribute to language maintenance efforts and greater understanding of why gendered adaptations to dialects occurred. These adaptations point toward a history that should be learned from and studied rather than ignored. A critical part of this heritage is the decades-long period in which women were excluded from outside life and banded together in solidarity against the Arab “otherness” or took refuge in their own “other” identity. By adopting the Tifnagh script, creating ICRAH without female inclusion, and resisting female linguistic influences, the urban elite men are further marginalizing these women and undermining the survival of Tamazight dialects.

The forces behind Berber reawakening face hard questions in their search to save their culture as the looming threat of urbanization and globalization reduces the self-sufficiency of small, traditional communities. As Arabness begins to infringe upon female communities, male elites should encourage Amazigh women to join the conversation, and share the valuable lessons which have allowed their community to survive thus far, rather than advocating for increased seclusion in their attempts to standardize the script and culture through the male lens. 

Endnotes:
5. Amazigh and Berber are interchangeable terms used when referencing this ethnic group. While certain groups prefer the use of Amazigh over Berber, or vice versa, both terms are politically correct. When referencing language, Tamazight is the umbrella script or language which activists are in the process of standardizing and coding.
11. Linton 1965
13. Ennaji 2005, 21
15. Language shift frequently takes place in a reaction to external pressures or internal changes within language communities. These are influenced, consciously and subconsciously, by social changes such as demographic factors, economic forces, mass media and social trends (such tendencies are strong among the young, who increasingly ascribe low status to native languages (Undescribed and Endangered Languages).
851-880. 2010. (855)
20. Ibid.
22. Ibid., 88.
23. Ibid., 88-89.
24. Ibid.
25. Ibid.
26. While the adoption of an Arab-Muslim identity is an important justification for the Arabization movement, the Arabization movement stripped away the social sciences during a period of unrest under Hassan II. The monarchy was plagued by university dissidents and the rise of communism within the intellectuals of this period. Arabization (and thus Islamization) effectively limited monarchical opponents.
27. Maddy-Weitzman, 90
28. Ibid., 89
29. Ibid., 91
30. Ibid., 92-93
34. Hoffman 2006, 157
35. Ibid., 157-158
40. In some rural areas, children have to travel miles to reach the school and it is therefore seen as easy to abduct girls. Additionally, Moroccan public schools conduct lessons in Standard Arabic and emphasize the Islamic identity in early grade school.
42. Ibid.
43. Hoffman 2006
44. Ibid., 155
49. Hoffman 2006, 153
50. Research states that language shifts are more related to the feeling than to the needs of communities. Members of communities may opt to give up their language and move closer to the lingua franca, as they can no longer see the value in their retention of the mother tongue (Undescribed and Endangered Languages).
51. Specifically, Morocco has reservations in reference to Articles 2 and 15(4). The former requires signatory states to institute gender equality in their legal orders, including national constitutions; the later regulates the individual’s right to freedom of movement and the freedom to choose her residence and domicile (Elliott, Katja Zvan. 2014. "Morocco and Its Women’s Rights Struggle: A Failure to Live Up to Its Progressive Image." Journal of Middle East Women’s Studies (Duke University press). 18).